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ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS ACTIONS SEEKING 
DAMAGES 
Richard D. Lamm 
Diredor. Stud.nt P,odic. Progra", 
.. ""dot. ProI ... or 01 law. U"j.,.,.;', 01 D.nver 
De"",, Colorado 
Steve Davison 
THE NEED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
CLASS ACTION SUITS 
The National Academy of Sciences recently pnblished 
a book entitled Resources aud Mau' which dramatically 
forecast the geometric increase in competition for re-
sources, space, recreation, transportation, housing, and 
public and private facilities of all kinds. It was critical 
of the lack of resource planning for the future and 
strongly recommended new institutions and policies to 
help insure wise resource use and improved resource 
policies. Other scholars have stressed the necessity for 
new legal tools in assessing technology, which is today 
causing a millenium of change every few years. 
There is growing concern for whether or not our legal 
problem-solving machinery has the ability to adequately 
protect mankind from the dangers of the present and 
to plan for the future. One necessary legal tool which 
can be effectively explored is the citizen class action 
law suit. 
New proposals have been introduced in Congress allow-
ing consumer class action lawsnits' ami citizen lawsuits 
for environmental protection.' The justification for these 
1 National Academy of Sciences, R~'Ou.Tce8 and Man (1969) . 
• S. 1980, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) • 
• S. 3575, 9lat Cong., 2d Sos •• (1970). 
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proposals is that new systmns are needed to act as checks 
and balances and to insure a proper weighing of the "pub-
lic interest." This justification has been the basis for the 
increasing tendency of the federal courts to allow mem-
bers of the puhlic to challenge the actions of the federal 
administrative agencics.· 
There is a definite trend, both in Congress and in the 
Courts, to broaden the decision-making process of ad-
ministrative government. Experience has shown that 
administrative agencies do not always adequately pro-
tect the public interest. Then Judge, now Chief Justice, 
Burger stated in Office of COllummicatiolts of Ultited 
Church of Christ v. F.C.C.:' 
The theory that the Commission can always effec-
tively represent the listener interests in a renewal 
proceeding withont the aid and participation of 
legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role 
of private attorneys general is one of those assmnp-
tions we collectively try to work with so long as they 
are reasonably adequate. 'Vhen it hecomes clear, 
as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid 
assumption which stands up under the realities of 
actual experience, neither we nor the Commission 
4 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F,P,C' I 364 
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1966), c.rt. lumied 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Office of 
Communications of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C .• 369 F.2d 994 
(C.A.D.C. 1966); Crowther v. Seaborg. 312 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Colo. 
1970). 
5359 F.2d 994. 1003 (C.A.D.C. 1966). 
Public agencies aJso have their inadequacies; they also need 
their system of checks and balances. Some are given inconsistent 
functions like the A.E.C., which must both police and promote 
the peaceful use of the atom. Some become captive of the in· 
dustry they are supposed to regulate, some RTe lazy, some are 
ignorant, some are victims of Parkinson's law. Their interest are 
not always synomous with the public interest. 
Testimony of Richard D. Lamm on S. 3575, gIst Cong., ld Seas. 
(before Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Re-
sources and Environment) (May 14, 1970). 
• 
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can continue to rely on it. The gradual expansion 
and evolution of concepts of ~tand i ng in aclministra-
61 
, tive law attests that e'.-perience rather than logic 
or fixed rules has been accepted as the guide. 
• 
Citizen lawsuits are increasingly being proposed to act 
as an independent mechanism to supplement agency 
action, to monitor and check agency aUlI executive action, 
to spotlight needed areas of legislation and to insure 
the inclusion of and the adequate weighing of all relevant 
factors. 
The environmental class action suit is an important 
citizen action mechanism. It allows the "small stake 
holder in a large controversy" to come to court and lay 
more than his individual interest before the court. It 
allows him to propose to the court that more than his 
individual rights are at stake; that class or public rights 
are to be weighed. 
The class action is a procedural mechanism which, 
while it does not create substantive rights in class 
members,' does have considerahle value as a strategic 
device far beyond its ostensiblc purpose to reduce a 
"multiplicity of litigatiou.'" 
One court perhaps more accurately described the 
class action as "a way of redressing group wrongs ... , 
a semi-public remedy administered by the lawyer in 
private practice-a cross between administrative action 
and private action."· Its increasing use in litigation of 
all types, and its recent well-publicized use in a number 
of environmental and resource controversies, dictate a 
close examination of its component parts. 
Class actions are a particularly useful procedural tool 
6 Pacific Inter.CJub Yacht Ass'n. v. Morris, 197 F. Supp. 218 
(N.D. Calif. 1960), appeal dism'd 288 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1961). 
1 See Dolgow v. Anderaon, 43 F.R-D. 472, 481, 484-486 (E.n.N.Y. 
1968). 
BId. at 481. 
, 
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in seeking group redress in important but limited 
situations, but are not a cornucopia of remedies for all 
societal ills; they are not devices for the strike-suit, the 
champertous of the self-promoting litigator. ~'he patent 
mmesses of some of the "class actions" recently filed show 
that the limitations and dangers of Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are not widely understood. 
DEFINITION OF THE CLASS 
The initial issue in any class action litigation is the 
definition of the class. The parameters of the size of the 
class are defined neither by rule nor by case law. On the 
lower limit, a class which contained twenty-five individ-
uals has been upheld.' On the upper parameter, there is 
language that the size of a class is not an inherent objec-
tion to maintenance of a class action.'o Neither is the 
maintenance of a class action precluded by the failure 
to state the exact number of members of the class nor to 
individually identify every member of the class,l1 if the 
class is "defined with some precision. "11 
Examination of some of the recent pleadings in 
actions purporting to be class actions indicates the need 
for properly defined classes. In a suit seeking damages 
for harm to the environment allegedly caused by D.D.T. 
and for reparations to restore the quality of the environ-
9 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 
(E.D. Pa. 1968); but see Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 
(E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
10 EiBen v. Carlisle" Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). In 
EUfm, the court stated no objection to a clus numbering 3,760,000. 
11 Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. 
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
11 Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Lopez 
Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969), is an example of 
a class that was so vaguely defined that the court found that it would 
be an uimpo88ible task" to apply the definition of the class to de-
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ment allegedly degraded by D.D.T.," the class which 
the plaintiff is allegedly representing is "all the people 
of the United Statcs, not only of this generation, but 
of those generations, yet unborn, ... who are entitled 
to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the environment 
and natural resources of the several States and the 
United States without damage and degradation from 
the production, distribution and use ... " of D.D.T. The 
plaintiff in this action is also seeking to represent mu-
nicipal taxpayers, allegedly the equitable owners of 
natural resources held in trust for them by their munici-
pal governments, and seeking damages to restore these 
natural resources damaged by D.D.T. This action also 
is on behalf of, and asserting the rights of, "all the people 
of the United States, not only of this generation but of 
those generations yet unborn, ... to freedom from the 
involuntary accumulation of D.D.T. and its metabolites 
within the lipid tissues of their bodies." 
Cases challenging air pollution hy industry are simi-
larly seeking to represent a class composed of a large 
numher of individuals. In a suit to recover damages 
and to enjoin sulfur dioxide pollution by the American 
Smelting and Refining Company in EI Paso, Texas,14 
the plaintiffs seek to represent citizens and residents 
of Texas, New Mexico, and Mexico, who have suffered 
injury, damages, annoyance, and inconvenience from 
the alleged pollution of the air by the defendants, and 
those who have shown "a special interest" in protecting 
the public, their property, and the environment f rom 
damage by air pollution. In an amended complaint,1S 
II Yannacone v. Montrose Chern. Co., No. 3761~9 (S.D.N.Y., IIled 
OcL 14. 1969), Individual damages f or each member ot this class 
is not explicitly requested by the pleadings, however. 
14 Fischer v. American Smelting & Refining Co., No. 70-CIU-729 
(S.D.N.Y., IIled Feb. 24, 1970). 
IS 70.ClU.729 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 19, 1970). 
, 
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new plaintiffs were added, suing on behalf of all those 
people, both of this generation and of the generations 
yet unborn, entitled to the protection of their healtlI 
and welfare and to the protection of their environment 
from damage from the failure of the defendant to install 
"state-of-the-art" pollution control equipment. 
An examination of the requirements of Rule 23 shows 
the patent excesses of tlIese defined classes. Rule 23 
first requires, in order to maintain a class action, that 
"tlIe class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable .... "" This requirement refers not to 
"impossibility of joinder but only to the difficulty or 
inconvenience of joinder of tlIe entire class."17 No one 
would argue that tlIe classes defined in the previously 
discussed environmental class actions meet tlIis require-
ment. 
The next Rule 23 requirement, tlIat "there must be 
questions of law and fact common to the class ... ," 
has been reiterated by a number of courts without giving 
real help as to what are questions of law or fact common 
to the class.18 A statement by another court, however, 
provides support to which tlIe presumptuous pleader 
,. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1). 
17 Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 
913-914 (9th Cir. 1964) . 
•• Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1952) 
U[T]here must be some community of interest"j Knowles v. War 
Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15,17 (C.A.D.C. 1949), ccrt. denied 336 U.S. 
914 (1949): U[AJ common and undivided interest in the subject matter 
of the cause of action"; Coke v. Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579, 583 (N.D. 
Ga. 1960): "identity of interest"; Weisman v. M.e.A., Inc., 45 F.R.D. 
258, 262 (D. Del. 1968): "Where • • • the question common to all 
members of the class clearly predominate." 
This requirement is similar to the additional requirement of Rule 
23 (b) (3) and the courts often "determine the (a) (2) prerequisite of 
a common question by questioning the predominance of common 
issues." Note, "Class Actions Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years 
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can point to justify inclusion in his class of "all the 
people in the United States": 
The common issues need not be dispositive of the 
entire litigation. The fact that questions peculiar to 
each individual member of the class may remain 
after the common questions have been resolved does 
not dictate the conclusion that a class action is not 
pennissible.'· 
The requirements of Rules 23(a)(1) and 23(a)(2) 
are, however, not the only requirements for definition 
of a class under Rule 23}a In addition, the requirements 
of either Rule 23(b)(1)(A), 23(h)(1)(B), 23(b)(2), or 
23(b) (3) must be satisfied. 
Environmental class actions seeking damages, as in 
the illustrative purported class actions previously men· 
tioned, will usually faIl under Rule 23(b)(3)}1 Environ· 
mental class actions seeking damages will not fall under 
Rule 23(b)(1) (A), since the threat of incompatible 
standards can arise only in situations where equitable 
relief is sought, as in class actions involving the rights 
and duties of riparian owners, or of the rights and 
duties of a land owner with respect to a nuisance.2l In 
19 Dolgow, N. 7 supra at 490. 
20 Advisory Committee's Note of 1966 to Revised Rule 23, 39 
F.R.D. 100 (1966). 
l' Class ... lions under Rule 23(b) (3) are regarded as "not aa 
clearly called for" as under Rule. 23(b) (1) and 23(h) (2). Advisory 
Committee's note supra, 39 F .R.D. at 102. Actions have not been 
classified as Rule 23(b) (3) clus actions if they meet the require-
ments of Rule 23(b) (1) or 23(b) (2). Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 259 
F. Supp. 125, 13~131 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Berman v. Narragansett 
Raeing A .. 'n, (8 F.R.D. 333, 337 (D.R.I. 1969). Tbis haa been done 
on the grounds that if the action is classified as a 23(b) (3) action, 
members of the class may elect not to be included within the class 
and would not be bound by the judgment. Van Gemert, supru at 130. 
This would result in separate litigation by individual members of the 
dus, placing an undue burden on the judiciary. and would contravene 
the stated purpooes of Rule. 23(b) (l)(A) and 23 (b)(l) (b). 
2l See Note, N. 20 ... pra at 100. 
, 
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environmental actions that seek damages, as in the 
El Paso case, adjudications with respect to the claims 
for damages by individuol members of the class would 
not dispose of nor substantiolly impair the interests of 
the other members of the class, so that they would not 
come within the sphere of Rule 23(b)(1)(b).n Claims 
for damages for injury to health or welfare from air 
pollution, pesticides or radiation would involve indi-
vidual, separate, and distinct claims; a resolution of 
one such claim would not, except for stare decisis, impair 
or dispose of other individual claims arising from the 
pollution or environmental degradation by the defendant. 
Neither can environmentol class actions seeking damages 
be brought under Rule 23(b) (2), since this section is 
inapplicable where the appropriate relief relates "ex-
clusively or predominately to money damages."" 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the questions of law or 
fact common to members of the class predominate over 
questions affecting only individual members.'s That 
.. Id. at 101-102. 
Zf Jd. at 102; see Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 
395 F.2d. 920, 987 (2d Cir. 1968); Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 
550,555 (D. Md. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 364 F.2d 197 (4th 
Cir. 1966); Wittkamper v. Harvey, 188 F. Supp. 715 (M.D. Ga. 
1960). 
25 Rule 23 (b) (3) also requires that a class action be superior to 
other methods "for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con~ 
troversy .. . ," such as consolidation of actions or test cases by BOrne 
members of the class. See N. 20 supra at 103. Rule 23 (b) (3) suggests 
pertinent factors, which are not exhaustive, Id. at 104, to aid the 




ceedings. The factors listed in the rule are: " 
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy --
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the 
desirability or undesirabiJity of concentrating the litigation of 
the claims in the particular forumi (D) the difficulties likely 
to be eneountered in the management of a class action. 
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members of the class seek or allege differing amounts 
of damages does not of itself preclude a class action 
under Rule 23(b) (3) where there is a preponderance 
of questions in common." 
In determining predominance, the test is not the total 
amount of time to be spent on proof of the common 
issues, as compared to the time to be spent on proof 
of individ\lal damages, but rather is the time which 
would be spent in proof of the common issues in the 
class action as compared to the time which would be 
spent if no class action was allowed, and a large multi-
tude of suits, each involving proof of the common issues, 
were brought.17 Individual questions of damages, how-
ever, clearly predominate over common issues in large-
scale serions injuries. The Advisory Committee stated: 
A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous 
persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class 
action because of the likelihood that significant 
separate lawsuits, however, ffmay be theoretic rather than practical: 
the class may have a high degree of cohea ion and prosecution of the 
action through representatives would be quite unobjectionable, or the 
amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits 
would be impracticable." Advisory Committee's Note, supra. at 104. 
The adverse effects upon the defendant that would result from the 
maintenance of separate suits should be also eonsidered. Id. 
%Ii Konisberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Advisory Committee's Note. aupra, 39 F.R.D. at 
103 j see Eisen, N. 10 supra at 566; Dolgow, N. 7 aupra. at 490. 
Though injuries and damages to the members of the class were 
separately and distinctly caused, if they were the result of a common 
course of conduct, there is a question common to the class which 
predominates for purpose. of Rule 23(b) (3). Dolgow, N. 7 ."pra, at 
490. 
UPotential rivalry between class members after an initial finding 
of liability can be adequately handled since the rule gives a 
court the power to divide the class into appropriate subclasses 
or to require the members to bring indivjdual suits for damages." 
Eisen, N. 26 aupr4 at 566. 
17 Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D. Minn. 
1968). 
; 
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questions, not only of damages but of liability ami 
defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the 
individuals in different ways. In these circumstances 
an action conducted nominally as a class action would 
degenerate in practice into multiple law suits sep-
arately tried"· 
Environmental class actions seeking damages for 
injury to health or welfare from pesticides, air pollution, 
or radiation would clearly be analogous to the "mass 
accident" example. Damages and liability would de-
pend upon many issues affecting the individual members 
of the class in different ways. 
For example, Yamlacone v. Montrose Chemical Co'" 
has placed at issue the effects of D.D.T. upon the wild-
life resources of the entire United States, as well as 
upon the biological systems of every American. Because 
the action seeks damages, to be distributed to local, 
state, and federal governments to be used to remedy 
the damage done by D.D.T. to the natural resources 
and environment of the United States, the application 
of D.D.T. to every area of the United States and the 
effect of D.D.T. upon the environment of each particular 
area will be at issue. 
Even if injunctive relief and not damages were re-
quested, proof of the amount of D.D.T. applied in every 
area of the United States would be required. Even the 
effects of particular quantities of D.D.T. on particular 
species would in reality not be a common issue, since 
these effects would depend upon when the D.D.T. was 
applied, the concentration of the application, and, 
possibly, the effects of D.D.T. on each species in a 
particular geographical area. 
Even fewer common issues of law and fact are pre-
sented with respect to the class of those whose bodies 
11 Advisory Committee's Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 103. 
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have been nllegedly damaged by D.D.T., a class that 
could be composed of every resident of the United 
• States.'· The claims of each individual member of this 
class will yal'y with respect to the !lmount of D.D.T. 
applied in areas where he has resided and the date that 
the D.D.T. was so applied- factors that bear on the 
concentration and effects of D.D.T. on cach individual 
citizen. Common issues of law and fact would clearly 
not predominate in this class ; therefore these claims 
can not be brought as a Rule 23(h) (3) class action. Sup-
porting this conclusion is that notice, because the 
presently defined classes potentially include all residents 
of the United States, cannot possibly reach all members 
of this class." Consequently, this action may forever 
• 
• 
bar many millions of Americans, without their knowl-
edge, from future claims against tllP manufacturers of 
D.D.T. for bodily injury. The fact tlmt D.D.T. concen-
trations will vary even with in a narrow geographical 
area, with vary ing conccntration of D.D.T. and varying 
effects from D.D.T. on the residents of the area, indi-
cates that even a reduced form of class action should 
not be allowed to be maintained for individual damages. 
Environmental lawyers mnst take great care that 
their claims do not innoculate the courts against all 
environmental class actions. There are many less gran-
diose but vali(l IIses of class actions as prophylaxis 
against environmental or conSllmer damage. In many 
cases the amount of individual damages is not im-
portant because it is "de minimis" and restoration is 
impossible. In Bebchick v. Public Utilities COllunissionl1 
and Dar,. v. Yellow Cab Co.," the class action was used 
0", JO Though claims for individual damages are not explicitly pleaded 
as reHef, N. 13 8upra, such claims might be regarded as in issue 
under liberal rules of pleading. 
31 See Philadelphia, N. 9 &upra. at 461-462 . 
.. 318 F.2d 187 (C.A.D.C. 1963). cert. d.,.ied 373 U.S. 913 (1963). 
J3 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732. 63 Cal. Reptr. 724 (1967). 
, 
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to rebate overcharges, not to the actual individuws 
injured, but to the general class by lowering future 
fares. In environmentw protection it is also necessary 
to be able to use Rule 23 to benefit the class, qua class, 
and to require a defendant to pay damages for his 
action despite the impossibility of individual restitu-
tion. These rebate cases show the usefulness of both 
Rule 23 and broad definitions of the class where the 
cornmon question is the action or unjust gain of the 
defendant, rather than the damage to the plaintiff. 
Contemporary law, while stressing individual restitu-
tion, nlso recognizes a very important deterrent ami 
corrective effect in damage actions. 
In environmental class actions seeking damages for 
injury from pesticides, air pollution, or radiation, where 
the members of an amorphous, anonymous, and un-
quantifiable class are asserting separate and distinct 
damage claims, as in the El Paso case, there can be no 
cohesion between the members of the class. The El Paso 
pleadings contain internal inconsistencies, since if the 
henlth effects allegedly caused by the pollution are as 
severe as pleaded, the individual claims are large 
enough to justify maintenance of separate suits. In 
addition, where the size of the class is in the hundreds 
of thousands, or even millions, with the individunl 
members of the class having separate and distinct claims, 
as in the D.D.T. and El Paso cases, there will be extreme 
difficulty in managing the class action. The logical has 
been carried to the absurd. 
DETERMINATION OF MAINTENANCE 
OF CLASS ACTION 
".As soon as practicable after the commencement of an 
action brought as a class action," the court must deter-
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action'" The rule "calls upon the judges to judge,"!5 and 
places upon the court the affirmative dllty to make this 
determination even in the absence of a proper motion by 
the plaintiff or defendant as to the propriety of the main-
tenance of the class action .... This determination must be 
made even if the defendant offers no resistance to the 
class action." 
"The burden is on the plaintiffs to establish their right 
to maintain a class action .... But this does not mean 
... that plaintiffs must finally establish their entire case 
before a preliminary determination of the class action 
question can be made.'''· The court should exercise its 
duties with particular care, and should be rigorous in 
having the plaintiff satisfy this burden of proof, in en-
vironmental class actions such as the Et Paso and D.D.T. 
enses, where the dangers of abuse are so great. 
The court may allow the class action to proceed on a 
conditional basis, such as by ordering that "a class action 
may be maintained only if the representation is improved 
through intervention of additional parties of a stated 
type," and may alter or amend its determination "before 
the decision on the merits if, upon fuller development of 
the facts, the original detennination appears unsound.lIl• 
34Rule 23(c) (1), See the section on Res Judicata: Compromise, 
Settlement and Notice for the relationship between Rule 23(e) and 
23(c) (1). 
lS Frankel, "Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 
23," 43 F.RD. 39, 40 (1968). 
315 Weisman, N. 18 supra. at 271, N. 1; Ziegler v. Gibralter Life 
Ins. Co., 43 F.RD. 169, 170 N. 1 (D.S.D. 1967). 
37 Ziegler, N. 36 .upra.. 
•• Philadelphia Elec., N. 9 '''I'ra at 457. 
39 Ibid.; see Weisman, N. 18 BUpra at 265j Ziegler, N. 36 .upra,' cf 
Richland v. Chetham, 272 F. Supp. 148, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where 
the court disapproves of allowing a class action to )Jroceed condi. 
tionally, finding it preferable to proceed "by consolidation and inter-
vention without prejudice to subsequent dass action treatment if, 
upon further development of the litigation, it appears appropriate," 
72 MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 
Even if individual questions arise during the course 
of litigation, which render the action 'unmanageable' 
the court still has thc powcr at that time to dismiss 
the class aetion and permit the plaintiff to proceed 
only on behalf of himself.4• 
.A:ny deficiencies in the pleading of a class action are 
subject to correction by amendment.41 
The fact that plaintiffs' definition of the class is not 
acceptable does not require dismissal of the class 
allegations ... . (C)ourts should employ the full 
measure of the discretion granted by the Rule, when-
ever a fair reading of the complaint permits, to de-
fine classes .. ; in a manner which will permit utili-
zation of the class action procedure." 
In cases such as the D.D.T. and El Paso class actions, the 
courts should require that the classes be more conserva-
tively defined, rather than allowing the action to proceed 
conditionally as a class action. The strong likelihood of a 
multitude of individual issues arising, and the impossi-
bility of providing actual notice to members of the class, 
combined with the binding effect of thc judgment, sug-
gest that redefinition of the class by amendment of the 
pleadings is the proper solution in the D.D.T and El Paso 
class actions. 
STANDING TO MAINTAIN CLASS ACTIONS 
A common issue in environmental litigation arises un-
der Rule 23(a), which states that "[olne or more mem-
bers of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all . . ." members of the class when 
the other requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied. The ques-
tion of who is a member of a class is an important issue 
40 Eisen, N. 10 supra at 566. 
41 Ziegler. N. 36 "'p"G at 176. 
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in environmental class actions where nonprofit conserva-
tion corporations sue on behalf of a class of individuals 
to enjoin threatened environmental degradation." Often, 
only sllch corporations are able to muster the scientific 
evidence, expert witnesses, and the expenses of litigation 
and to provide the respectability in the eyes of the court 
and the public necessary for the successful prosecution 
of environmental litigation. The Supreme Court has 
stated that the plaintiffs in a class action "cannot repre-
sent a class of whom they are not a part.' .... However, 
the language of Rule 23(a) does not define who is a mem-
ber or a "part" of a class. 
Though the Supreme Court generally denies standing 
to one seeking to assert the rights of another,'s this "is 
only a rule of practice" which may be "outweighed by the 
need to protect the fundamental rights which wonld 
[otherwise] be denied ... .' ... Thus, in N.A.A.C.P. v. 
State of Alabama," the N.A.A.C.P. was held to have 
standing to assert the First Amendment rights of asso-
ciation of its members that were allegedly violated by 
Alabama statues which required the N.A.A.C.P. to give 
its Jist of members to the Alabama Attorney General. 
The "nexus" between the N.A.A.C.P. and its members 
was held to be sufficient to permit the N.A.A.C.P. to 
represent the rights of its members." Standing was also 
upheld on the grounds that the constitutional rights of the 
members of the N.A.A.C.P. to withhold their membership 
4) See, e.g., Defenders of FJoriasant, Inc. v. Park Land Co., C·1539 
(D. Colo. 1969); Colorado Open Space Coordinating Council, Inc. v. 
Seaborg, C-1712 (D. Colo. 1969) • 
.. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 81, 32-33 (1962) • 
• 5 See, e.g. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) • 
.. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953); see N.A.A.C.P. 
v. Patty, 169 F . Supp. 603, 529 (E.D. Va. 1968), ,ov'd on olk., 
grounds sub nom. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959) • 
• ' 367 U.S. 449 (1958) • 
•• Jd. at 468-459. 
, 
74 MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 
in the organization from the knowledge of the State of 
Alabama would be nullified if they personally sought to 
enforce their rights in court. The court rela.""ed lhe rules 
of standing since the constitutional rights of the members 
of the N.A.A.C.P. "could not be effectively vindicated 
except through an appropriate representative before the 
Court.'''· Through N .A.A.C.P. v. Alabama deillt only with 
the standing of organizations to assert its members con-
stitutional rights of association with respect to the or-
ganization, the Supreme Court has upheld the stamling 
of a trnde association to represent lhe interests of its 
members with respect to Iln order of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission 50_a matter not related to its mem-
bers' rights of association. In Norwalk Core v. Norwalk 
Redcvelopmf.!1t Agency'>' the court stllte<l, thongh not 
ruling on the matter, that 
We think that the reasons for r9{1Iliring an imlivillllal 
plainliff in a class action to be a memhHr of tllP class 
do not necessarily preclude an association frolll rp]I-
resenting a class where its raj"OIt d' dn, is to repre-
sent the interests of that class. . . . [Hjowever, 
whether the association plaintiffs have standing ... 
depends on whether there is compelling nped to grnnt 
them standing in order that the constitutional rights 
of persons not immediately before the court might lJe 
vindicated. See N.A.A.C.P. I'. State of Alabama "X 
reI. Patterson . .. (We rpject the ... contention 
that an association cannot represent the rights of its 
members unless the interests of the association itself 
are involved. In N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama ex 
reI. Patterson, the Supreme COllrt s}Jecifically re-
ferred to the likelihood that the association its!'lf 
would IJe adversely affect!'d as a 'further factor' 
49 N. 47 Bupra at 459; see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
428 (1953); Loui.iana ex. reI. Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P., 366 U.S. 293 
(1961); National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 
U.S. 246 (1963) . 
so National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n, N. 49'· '"'FII. 
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pointing toward thn holrling of standing . ... ) It ap-
pears to liS that the iml ivi<lnal plaintiffs can a<le-
quately n~llres(>nt the interests of all mpmhers of til!' 
relevant class, but we will not prl!chule the plaintiffs 
from trying to show to the District Conrt's satisfac-
tion that it is only the association plaintiffs which 
can I)CrJorm this function.52 
In Smith 11. Board of Education,S' a teacher's associa-
tion, suing on hehalf of a class of Negro teachers to en-
join discriminatory practices in the hi ring and assign-
ment of t!·aclH.'l's, was held to have standing to represent 
the class. The court heM that the teacher's association 
should have standing as a n'al party in interest because 
the dismissal of teachers might a<lvers(!ly affect it, dne 
to a decrease in membership and financial support, and 
because the individual members of the class might be de-
terred, because of fear of reprisals, from hringing snit 
themselves, or might lose interest in the litigation, if ami 
when they obtained other jobs after discriminatory re-
fusals to hire.54 Because the plaintiff teacher's association 
was a real party in interest under Rule 17(a), the court 
stated that it was also a "member" of the class it sought 
to represent. 55 
51Id. at 937-938. 
53 365 F.2d 770 (8th Clr. 1966). 
$4 Id. at 776-777. 
55 Ibid.; see also N.A.A.C.P. and Harrison. N. 46 supr .. ; W.A.C.O. 
v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Shelton v. McKinley, 
174 F. Supp. 351, 355 (E.D. Ark. 1959). r.~'d on other grounds sub 
nom. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Alabama State 
Teaehers Ass'n v. Lowndes County Bd. of Educ., 289 F. Supp. 300, 
302 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Buford v. Morganton City Bd. of Educ., 244 
F. Supp. 437, 445 (W.D.N.C. 1965) . One case has held that an or-
ganization cannot represent the rights of the individual members of 
the class. C.O.R.E. v. Comm'r" Social Security Administration, 270 
F . Supp. 537 (D. Md. 1967). However, in that cue there were no 
allegations that the defendants had acted illegally toward any of the 
individual members of the clus. Therefore, no interest of the class 
was alleged to have been violated, and there was no evidence in-
dicating that it would be difficult for the members of the clus to 
, 
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1I'/lnealk Core and Smith 1). Board of Education Im\'(' 
tllll~ ('xhmded N.A.A.C.P. 1'. Ala/Jallla to allow organiza-
tions to have standing in class actions on behalf of the 
interests of individual memhers where the purpose of the 
organization includes representation of the interests of 
that class, and where there is a compelling need to grant 
them standing in order that the rights of the individual 
membcrs of the class can be effectively vindicated. Among 
the "compelling reasons" for allowing standing to organi-
zations in environmental class actions would he the fear 
of "<'prisal for hringing the law suit, eventual lack of 
interest in the litigation by an individual class member,5' 
the fact that expenses of the snit would be so great "that 
it could not be prosccuted withollt ontside l1i(I,"51 or the 
likelihood that a vigorolls prosecution of the suit could 
not he made without the expertise in litigation and the 
expert scientific witnesses that the organization could 
bring to the action.s8 
vindicate their rights themselves. The denial of standing to a non-
profit corporation representing a majority of the incorporated mu-
nicipalities in Nebraska and to 8n unincorporated labor association 
in League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 
(D. Neb. 1962), a suit to declare a state legislative apportionment 
statute unconstitutional, can be distinguished on the grounds that 
their raison d'etre (see Norwalk Core. N. 24 Bupra.) did not include 
the protection of individual voters, whose rights were infringed by 
unconstitutional apportionment and who would have standing to 
maintain the action. 209 F. Supp. 189, 191. "The denial of standing 
to two welfare rights organizations in National Welfare Rights 
Organization v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), i. dis-
tinguishable on the grounds that there was no showing of "lack of 
effective representation, gross adverssrial inequality, or any practical 
Dr theoretical obstacle to the individual plaintiffs' effective assertion 
of their claims." IcL at 1348. 
56 Smith, N. 63 supra. at 776-777. 
51 N.A.A.C.P., N. 46 .upra at 509. 
58 See Norwalk, N. 24 supra at 938: U[W]hether the association 
plaintiffs have standing ... depends on whether ... it is only the 
association plaintiffs which can . .. adequately represent the inter-
ests of all members of the relevant class. . . . n 
• 
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Courts have allowed standing to organizations to bring 
class actions without requiring a showing that there was 
a compelling need for granting standing to the organiza-
tion or that only the organization could adequately prose-
cute the class action. In Crowther v. Seaborg,s, a suit to 
enjoin the flaring of r adioactive natural gas by the A.E.C. 
from an underground cavern into the atmosphere, a non-
profit public benefit conservation corporation, the Colo-
rado Open Space Coordinating Council, was held to have 
standing to bring "a class action on behalf of all persons 
entitled to the protection of their health and the use and 
enjoyment of the natural resources of Colorado." C.O.S.C. 
was held to have standing "to assert the interests of its 
incorporators and the public for whose benefit it was 
formed.' .... 
Crowther v. Seaborg would thus grant standing to con-
servation organizations to bring environmental class ac-
tions on behalf of individual members, where their cor-
porate purpose included the protection of the interests 
of the members of the class, without regard to whether 
there was a "compelling need" to grant such standing. 
This would be the better rule, and one consistent with the 
latest statement of standing by the Supreme Court. 
The requirements of standing, as recently stated by 
the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing 
Service Organizations v. Camp" and Barlow v. Collins,"Z 
59 Crowther IN. 4 Bupra. 
60 Ibid. Two incorporated associations representing nudists were 
heJd to have standing to challenge a statute, prohibiting the practice 
of nudism, as representatives of their members. Roberts v. Clement, 
252 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) . The court, citing N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and N.A.A.C.P. and Harrison, N. 46 
supra, stated that "when civil rights are involved, these rights may 
be asserted by corporations in behalf of their members." 252 F. Supp. 
836; ct. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 
(C.A.D.C. 1970). 
" 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
02397 U.S. 159 (1970). 
, 
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are, first, that the plaintiff satisfy the "case or contro-
versy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution hy 
having the "personal stake and interest that impart the 
concrete adverseness required hy Article II!.'''' To sat-
isfy this requirement, the plaintiffs must allege "that the 
challenged action has caused ... injury in fact, eco-
nomic or otherwise."" In a suit to enjoin the Secretary 
of Transportation from approving, granting, or using 
Federal funds for a state secondary road project that 
allegedly would destroy the recreational and ecological 
values of a stream, this requirement was held satisfied hy 
an incorporated non-profit conservation organization 
whose purposes included protection of the area hy indi-
vidual citizens who used and enjoyed the area in question, 
and by an unincorporated association whose members 
used and enjoyed the area in question,os Though the opin-
ion did not state whether the suit was a class action, this 
case would allow standing to conservation organizations 
whose purposes included protecting areas threatened by 
environmental degradation, such as that in controversy, 
or protecting the interests of the members of the class 
they allegedly represent. 
The second requirement of standing is "whether the 
interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within 
the zone of interests to be protected by the statute or con-
stitutioual guarantee in question.''" Groups or individ-
uals concerned with the protection of historic, natural and 
scenic resources have been held to be within the zone of 
interests of statutes concerned with the protection of 
these factors in suits to restrain environmental degrada-
tion by federal agencies who allegedly are exceeding their 
Ii) Barlow, N. 62 supra at 164. 
o. N, 61 Bupr" at 162, 
65 Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, - F. 
Supp. - No. 70-123 (M,D. Pa. 1970) • 
.. N, 61 Bupro at 153, 
, 
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statutory authority or abusing their discretion." Conser-
vation organizations bringing class actions asserting the 
rights of individual members of the class which allegedly 
were protected by the constitution or statutes would also 
be within the "zone of interests," thus satisfying this sec-
ond requirement. 
Thus, under the latest statement of standing by the 
Supreme Court, conservation organizations would have 
standing to represent a class of individuals where their 
purpose included the protection of the area of the en-
vironment allegedly threatened or the protection of the 
interests of the class, without regard to whether there was 
a "compelling need" to grant this standing. 
ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION 
The quality of representation in a class action is crucial 
in the determination of the fairness and adequacy of rep-
resentation." In environmental litigation, the adequacy of 
representation by the plaintiff has an important bearing 
on the action. The ability of the representative party to 
present the scientific evidence requisite for success on the 
merits is an important criterion in environmental litiga-
tion. Presentation of proper claims and the raising of the 
relevant issues by the representative party are also im-
portant factors to success. There are numerous remedies 
which may be sought in an environmental law suit. Only 
a proper choice of the remedy requested will assure the 
greatest probability of success, as measured by the en-
vironmental protection that would be afforded by the re-
lief requested, and the probability of obtaining such relief 
from the court. These numerous factors which determine 
Itt N. 65 supt"(l.j Citizens Committee for the Hudson VaHey v. Volpe, 
302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), aff'd 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) • 
.. Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 206 (D.D.C. 1969). 
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the success of environmental litigation are directly de-
pendent on the adequacy of representation. 
A plaintiff has the burden of showing that he will ade-
quately and fairly protect the interests of the class." The 
adequacy and fairness of representation is determined by 
Rules 23(a) (3) and 23(a) (4). Rule 23(a) (3) requires that 
the claims of the representative party be typical of the 
claims of the members of the class. Rule 23(a)( 4) re-
quires that the representative party "will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class." These are the 
only two requirements to be used in determining ade-
quacy of representation.'" 
The requirement that the claim of the representative 
be typical of those of the entire class is the same as stat-
ing that the interests of the representative party must 
coincide with,n and "be compatible with and not antago-
nistic to those whom he would represent."'" If there is a 
conflict, it must be a substantial conflict between members 
of the class over the very issue in litigation to justify 
dismissal of a class claim for failure of adequacy of rep-
resentation." Though disparity in damages sought by 
members of the class may effect the issue of "predomi-
nWlce" under Rule 23(b) (3), such disparity does not make 
"Weisman, N. 18 .upm at 206. 
70 Shulman, N. 68, .upra.; Meraay v. Firat Republic Corp., 43 F.RD. 
465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
11 Meraay. N. 70 .uprtt. 
7Z Shulman, N. 68 ,upra at 207; ct. Eisen, N. 10 ,upTa at 562-663. 
n Mersay, N. 70 .upro at 468. A conflict of interest should not be 
found between the representative party and the members of the class 
merely because every individual member of the class ia not enthusi-
astic about the maintenance of the litigation. Eisen, N. 10 supra at 
563 N. 7; Shulman, N. 68 .upra. Thus, the fact that ninety-
eight members of a class filed affidavits either indicating that they 
did not want to be represented by the plaintill' or withdrawing from 
the suit did not warrant dismissal of the class action where the entire 
class numbered approximately 1,200. Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy 
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the claims of the representative atypicaP4 In asserting 
his own interests, the representative party must be able 
to assert the interests of all of the members of the class.n 
If the claims of the members of the cla8s are too varied, 
a few members of the class acting as representative 
parties may not have claims typical of the class so as to 
be adequate representatives of the class. Where the en-
vironmental class action involves separate and distinct 
claims by each member of the class in order to establish 
liability, such as in pesticide, air pollution, or radiation 
cases, the claims may be so disparate and the individual 
questions and issues so extensive, that no individual can 
have a typical claim nor fairly and adequately represent 
the multitude of claims." In some such circumstances, the 
court may be able to require a larger number of repre-
sentative parties whose interests, taken together, are 
typical of the varied interests of the members of the 
class.77 In other actions the mere size of the class will 
make adequate representation impossible. 
Adequacy of representation depends on other criteria. 
Objectively judged, all members of the class, including 
those who would prefer the status quo, should have their 
status "helped." At a minimum antagonistic interest 
should be eliminated "so far as possible.''''· The require-
meut that the representative party fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class is satifled where "the 
representative party ... [is] iuterested enough to be a 
forceful advocate and his chosen attorney. . . [is] quali-
:fled, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litiga-
74 Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 659, 667 (D. Minn. 
1968). 
7S Menay, N. 70 aupra at 470. 
" See section on Definition ot the Class, discuuinc the D.D.T. 
and El Pa.o eases. 
n See Note, uClass Actions Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years 
of Judicial Interpretation," 49 B.U.L. Rev. 68Z, 690 (1969). 
71 Eisen, N. 10 supra. 
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tion. 'rr. The burden of showing that he will ade-
quately and fairly represent the class does not require 
the plaintiff to present his attorney's qualifications, for 
the court may want to reserve judgment pending a later 
assessment "after a proper appraisal of all the factors 
enumerated on the face of the rule itself."·· In class ac-
tions, the counsel of a representative party is assumed to 
be a skilled practitioner, and able to properly conduct the 
class action, unless the contrary is shown.·1 The repre-
sentative party and his counsel must make the "vigorous, 
conseientious, and undivided effort required to 'fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.' , .. 1 The rep-
resentative party must be able to afford due process to 
the interests of the members of the class," since the judg-
ment in a class action is conclusive as to the rights of 
absent class members.·' The size of the individual interest 
which the representative party is asserting is immaterial 
where his representation will be fair and adequate.·s 
Adequate representation refers to the quality of rep-
resentation, not the quantity of representation.·' The fact 
that other members of the class have not sought to inter-
vene is not determinative of whether the plaintiff is a 
proper representative of the class.81 "Even one member of 
a large number of claimants can provide the kind of rep-
resentation for all which might otherwise be unattainable 
19 Shulman, N. 68 .upra; see Mersay, N. 70 ,upra. 
so Eisen, N. 10 .upra. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.Zd 
731 (2d Cir. 1965), c.rt. d."i<d 382 U.S. 816 (1969), suggests the 
rule be given a liberal interpretation. 
11 Dolgow, N. 7 ,upra at 496. 
81 Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th 
Cir. 1968). 
U Mersay, N. 70 supra. at 469 . 
• 4 Eisen, N. 10 .upra at 562. 
IS See Richland. N. 39 supra at 163 . 
.. William. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 234 F. Supp. 985, 987 
(E.D. La. 1964); Eisen, N. 10 ... pro at 563. 
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it each claimant had to act individually."" A class action 
should not be dismissed because members of the class not 
before the court have not expressed approval of the ade-
quacy of representation. Rather, the court should be more 
concerned "with those affirmative expressions of disap-
proval than with the sileuce of those represented."" 
Neither the number of representative parties in a class 
action nor the percentage of members of the class that 
are representative parties is determinative of adequacy 
or inadequacy of representation. Thus, in Eisen,to the 
court held that the fact that the representative party was 
allegedly representing a class of 3,750,000 and had only a 
small claim was not relevant to the adequacy of repre-
sentation. In Dolgow," the numerical disparity in a class 
action brought by four members of the class on behalf 
of 200,000 members of the class was held not to preclude 
maintenance of the class action.91 
In environmental class actions sllch as the El Paso and 
D.D.T. cases, however, no matter how vigorous a prosecu-
tor and how competent the plaintiff and his counsel, it is 
impossible to have fair and adequate representation. The 
claims of the members of the class are all separate and 
distinct, and establishment of liability requires proof of 
these millions of individual claims, which no representa-
tive party can do. In such cases, because of the spectre 
of the binding effect of the judgment, the impossibility 
that even a small percentage of the class will receive 
actual notice, and the many separate and distinct claims 
at issue, no party can provide the quality representation 
required to satisfy due process. In the El Paso and D.D.T. 
actions, silence of the class may well be misleading be-
"Ibid . 
• , Weisman, N. 18 .uprt& at 262. 
90 N. 10 "'pm. 
91 N. 7 .upra. 
.2 See also Siegel v. Chicken nelight. Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722. 727-
728 (N.n. Cal. 1967); Koni.herg, N. 26 lUJ>1'IL 
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cause of lack of actual notice and because most members 
of the class may not realize that they are members of the 
class. 
Another problem of adequacy of representation occurs 
if the action has become moot as to the plaintiff. Such a 
situation might arise in class actions seekiug damages 
for continuing air or water pollution that infringes upon 
rights of private property, where the plaintiff moves out-
side the area affected by the pollution. 
Where a plaintiff was a proper representative of a 
class at the time the action was filed, the action is not 
moot because the action has become moot as to the plain-
tiff." Such a result "would be contrary to the expressed 
purpose of Rule 23(e), which prohibits dismissal or 
compromise of a class action if the result would be to 
injure the other members of a purported class."" The 
court in Gaddis v. Wyalnu95 allowed intervention by 
members of the class who represented the interests of 
the class, permitting the action to continue, where the ac-
tion had become moot as to the plaintiff. Though no class 
determination had been made under Rille 23(c) (I) at the 
time the motion for intervention was made, "a class action 
must be presumed to have existed at the time of the filing 
of the motion for intervention."" 
The parties must prepare themselves for inquiry by 
the court on adequacy of representation. The defendant 
may want to use discovery to ascertain adequacy of rep-
resentation. In environmental actions, the adequacy of 
representation must depend heavily upon the ability of 
the representative party and his counsel to present the 
.. Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
··Ibid. 
.5 Ibid. 
961bid.j compare Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority, 406 F.2d 
1234 (7th eire 1969), holding that plaintiffs in a class action for 
whom the case was properly dismissed 8S moot could not continue to 
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requisite scientific evidence through expert witnesses. 
Thus, the prior experience of the plaintiff and his counsel 
in presenting scientific evidence through scientific wit-
nesses in environmental litigation would be a factor rele-
vant to adequacy of representation. The contacts which 
the plaintiff has with the scientific community, which 
would be indicative of the plaintiff's access to expert 
witnesses, and his ability to select the proper and best 
expert witness required to vigorously prosecute the ac-
tion, would also he relevant factors. 'l'he familiarity of 
the plaintiff's counsel with the area of science at issue in 
the litigation may be an important factor in determining 
adequacy of representation, since this is indicative of the 
counsel's ability to properly examine and cross-examine 
the expert witnesses during the trial. A factor in deter-
mining whether the plaintiff's claim was typical of those 
of other members of the class would be the involvement 
of the plaintiff in administrative proceedings or activities 
with respect to the controversy in the litigation." Where 
the representative party in a class action is a public bene-
fit, non-profit corporation, the court might inquire into 
its purposes and into its prior involvement in environ-
mental litigation to determine its ability to fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the individual mem-
bers of the class. 
AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS TO SATISFY 
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT" 
In order for the federal courts to have jurisdiction of 
actions under federal question jurisdiction" or under 
97 Ct . South Hill Neighborhood Asa'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454, 461 
(6th Cir. 1969). 
'" See 3 A.L.R. Fed. 373; Note, 49 B.U.L. Rev • • up,.,. at 712 • 
•• 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
, 
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diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,'" the value of the 
matter in controversy mnst exceed $10,000. 
Subsequent to the passage of amended Rule 23 in 1966, 
a number of courts held that amended Rule 23 had 
changed the rules with respect to class actions, permitting 
aggregation in "spurious"'·' class actions as well as in 
"true"'·' class actions.'o, However, other courts held that 
Rule 23, as amended in 1966, had not changed the prin-
ciple that separate and distinct claims could not he ag-
'DO 28 U.S.C. § 1382. 
lot In "SPUriOU8" c1au action. under old Rule 23, which were "in 
essence merely a form of permissive joinder in which parties with 
separate and distinct claims were allowed to litigate those claims in 
a single 8uit simply because the different claim. involved common 
questions of law or fact," the claims of the members of the class 
could not be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional amount require· 
ment. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969), rehea.ring denied 
394 U.S. 1026 (1969). Each plaintiff in a "spurious" due action had 
to demonstrate that his individual claim was in excess of the juris. 
dictional amount of $10,000. In a uspuriousJl class action. the right 
asserted by the plaintiff is peculiar to him. Booth v. General Dy· 
namic. Corp .• 264 F. Supp. 465. 470 (N.D. III. 1967). 
102 In claRs actions under Rule 23, prior to its amendment in 1966, 
the claims of the different members of the class in "true" class ae· 
tions. in which Nthe rights of the different class members were com· 
mon and undivided," could be a"regated in order to satisfy the 
jurisdictional amount requirement. Snyder, N. 101 supra at 336. 
The true class action is one wherein the joinder of all interested per· 
80ns would be required. M(Jor~'. Fedeml PrGctiu V 23.08. The claims 
in a true class are aggregated because "the right of each individual 
claimant depends on establishing the common or collective rights of 
the clus." Moore'. F.deral Practice • 23.13. A true class action 
is one based upon a public right, not upon a right peculiar to 
the plaintiff'; the aggregated amount of the public's claim is the 
value of the amount in controversy for purposes of satisfying the 
juriadictional amount. Moore, .up,"" , 23.13 at 23-2959-60. In a 
"true" class action, the "right asserted and the relief sought were 
for the welfare of the entire body politic rather than for the indi· 
vidual plaintiffs." Booth, N. 101 AprB at 470. 
'0' Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn. 389. F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1968) ...... ·ct 
sub nom.; Snyder, N. 101 supra,' Booth, N. 101 supra at 465i 
Snyder v. Epstein. 290 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Collins v. 
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gregated in class actions to satisfy the jurisdictional 
amount requirement.104 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Snyder v. 
Harris/os resolved this conflict by holding that Rule 23, 
as amended in 1966, had not changed the rule that the 
claims of the members of the class could be aggregated in 
"true" class actions to satisfy the jurisdictional amount 
requirement, but could not be aggregated in "spurious" 
class actions. 
Ya1Mtacone v. Montrose Chemical CO.,10G with claims 
on behalf of municipal, state and federal governments, 
seeking reparations to rehabilitate the environment in-
jured byD.D.T. and on behalf of those who have suffered 
involuntary accumulation of D.D.T. in their bodies, would 
be a "spurious" class action, since the claims would be 
separate and distinct. The right to recover reparations or 
individual damages would depend upon proof of individ-
ual damage, not upon the establishment of a common, 
public right. 
The El Paso l07 air pollution case, with claims based 
on injury to the health and welfare of the members of 
the class, is a "spurious" class action, involving separate 
and distinct claims of individual injury. Environmental 
class actions seeking damages that are on behalf of those 
whose health or safety have been injured, as in air pollu-
tion or pesticide cases, will be "spurious" class actions 
asserting separate and distinct claims. The claims of the 
104 Alverez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967), 
cert. de"ied 389 U.S. 827 (1967); Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 
(8th Cir. 1968), aff'd 394 U.S. 332 (1969) ; Pomierski v. W. R. Grace 
Co., 282 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Lesch v. Chicago & E . Ill. 
R.R., 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Neville v. Delta Ins. Co., 45 
F.R.D. 345 (D. Minn. 1968); Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 276 
F. Supp. 96, 99 (D. Minn. 1967). 
IDS Snyder, N. 101 supra. 
lOIS Yaconne, N. 13 supra. 
101 Fischer, N. 14 8upra. 
.' 
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members of the class will not be allowed to be aggregated 
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount, so that the plaintiff 
in such environmental class actions will have to have a 
claim in excess of the jurisdictional amount. This inabil-
ity to aggregate claims under amended Rule 23 may prove . 
one of the most serious obstacles to environmental class 
actions for damages, since representative parties in such 
actions will be either limited or non-existent. 
RES JUDICATA: COMPROMISE, SETILEMENT, 
AND NOnCE 
The Advisory Committee, in adopting new Rule 23 in 
1966, expressed dissatisfaction with the old "spurious" 
class action, which allowed members of snch classes to 
have "one-way" intervention-"being allowed to inter-
vene after a decision on the merits favorable to their 
interests, in order to secure the benefits of the decision 
for themselves, although they would presumably be un-
affected by an unfavorable decision."'·1 Under old Rule 
23, members of the class in a "spurious" class action (a 
form of permissive joinder where parties with separate 
and distinct claims litigated those claims in a single suit 
because there were more common questions of law and 
fact than individual questions),'·' were bound by the 
judgment only if they intervened and became parties to 
the proceeding. 11. In true class actions, in which mem-
bers of the class are asserting common and undivided 
rights,'" the judgment was binding on aU members of 
the class, whether they intervened in the action or not. III 
108 N. 20 ."PTa. at 105. 
109 Snyder, N. 101 .upro. at 336. 
110 MOOT.', Fetkral Proetiu. ~23.11 [6] at 23-2893. 
111 N. 109 BUpra.. See the discussion of true class actions in the 
section on "Aggregation of Claims for Jurisdictional Amount," text 
accompanying notes 102-103, supra.. 
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As uiscusscd in the section on Aggregation of Claims 
to Satisfy Jurisdictional Amounts, most environmental 
class actions seekin damages for injury to man or his 
environment from air pollution, pesticides, or rauiation 
woulu be classified as "spurious" class actions under old 
Rule 23. Under old Rule 23, judgments in such class ac-
tions woulu have bonnd only the members of the "spur-
ious" class action who sought to intervene in the action. 
Thus, if an environmental class action, classified as 
"spurious," resulted in an adverse judgment to the plain-
tiff, either because improperly brought or because it was 
a collusive or strike suit, only the rights of the plaintiffs 
and intervening class members would have been preju-
diced. 
However, under new RnIe 23, as amended in 1966, 
members of a class in an action maintained under Rule 
23(b)(l) or Rule 23(b)(2) cannot exclude themselves 
from the judgment: In a judgment in these class actions 
binus all members of the class, whether they appear in the 
action or not. "' In a class action maintained under Rule 
23(b)(3), the "best notice practicable under the circum-
stances" must advise the members of the class that the 
court will exclude them from the class if they so request, 
and that if the member does not request exclusion, the 
judgment, whether favorable or not, will be binding upon 
him."s 
The judgment in an action maintained as a class ac-
tion under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favor-
able to the class, shall include and specify or describe 
those to whom the notice provided in subdivision 
(c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested 
IURule 23(e) (3). 
114 Rule 28 (e) (3); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d 
Cir. 1968); Wren v. Smitb, 410 F.2d 390 (5th C;r. 1969); Siegel, 
N. 92 supra at 727. 
115 Rule 23(e) (2); Green, N. 114 supra at 298. 
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exclusion. and whom the court finds to be members of 
the claHs.'" 
Environmental class actions seeking damages, which 
would have been classified as "spurious" class actions 
under old Rule 23, could be classified as Rule 23(b) (3) 
class actions under RuJe 23, as amended in 1966.117 
The new Rule 23 consequently, has considerably 
changed the binding effect of judgments in environmental 
class actions seeking damages that would be classified as 
"spurious" class actions under old Rule 23. Under old 
RuJe 23, only members of the class who intervened in 
such "spurious" class actions would be bound by the judg-
ment, whereas under new Rnle 23, all members of the 
class would be bound by the judgment in such suits, un-
less they excluded themselves from the action under Rule 
23(b)(3). This is a significant difference, since under 
old RuJe 23 members of "spurious" class actions wonld 
be bound by a judgment only if they affirmatively inter-
vened. Under new RuJe 23, members of Rule 23(b) (3) 
class actions are bound by the judgment unless they 
affirmatively act to exclude tllemselves, III though not all 
members of the class have actual notice of the class 
action. 
By attempting to balance the burden of litigation and 
by requiring other class members to be bound after "the 
best notice practicable untler the circumstances," the rule 
has opened up a Pandora's box for the environmental 
litigator. He must beware of both friend and foe. 
The rights of members of the class may be bound by 
judgments in poorly prosecuted actions which are 
brought with little attendant publicity, and then settled, 
compromised, or hrought to judgment without members 
115 Rule 23(c) (3). 
In See text accompanying Ns. 106-107, supra. 
118 Cf. School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publishers, 
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of the class receiving notice (either because the clas3 was 
too broadly defined or the notice was inadequate for pro-
viding actual notice). A similar danger arises from collu-
sive and "strike" suits. An environmental tortfeasor 
might bar all future actions against itself for environ-
mental degradation by arranging a collusive suit, with 
little pUblicity and inadequate notice, that results in a 
judgment that bars all future suits for injunctive relief 
or damages. A plaintiff might file suit against an 
environmental polluter, and settle or compromise the 
suit for monetary compensation that is well below the 
potential liability of the defendant for environmental 
degradation or pollution. Such results are particularly 
harmful where the result bars future claims for environ-
mental degradation where future lmowledge establishes 
that the claim is far greater than presently thought, or 
makes it possible to establish the defendant's liability, 
which could not be done with present knowledge. 
One means of guarding against such abuse of the class 
action procedure in environmental class actions would 
be to require that a Rule 23 (c)( 1) hearing to define the 
class and examine the adequacy of representation be held 
before an action filed as a class action would be allowed 
to be compromised or settled under Rule 23 (e). By doing 
this, the court would allow an environmental class action 
to be settled or compromised only by one who was an 
adequate and fair representative of the class. With re-
spect to the fairness of representation where a settle-
ment or compromise is proposed, a court can carefully 
scrutinize the motives of the representative and the fair-
ness of the settlement to all members of the class. "' If 
119 Berger v. Purculator Prods., Inc., 41 F.R-D. 642, 643 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1966) ; Polakoff v. Delaware Steeplechase and Race Ass'n, 264 
F. Supp. 915, 917 (D. Del. 1966); cf . Philadelphia, N. 9 supra at 
326; and Berger, supra at 643, which hold that a Rule 23(0) (1) 
hearing did not have to be held it the not ice required by Rule 23 (e) 
,.,aa given. 
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the court can determine that an action was collusive it 
should dismiss it without entering judgment on the 
merits, for failure to state a ease or controversy as re-
quired by Article III of the Constitution.110 Determina-
tion of whether an action was collusive could be based 
upon the relationship of the plaintiff and his counsel to 
the defendant. If an action was determined to be a 
"strike" suit, the court should dismiss the action with 
prejudice only to the plaintiff, and award costs to the 
defendant. However, motivation is usually unascertain-
able. Courts have stated that there are other ways to 
guard against abuse of the binding effect of judgments 
in class actions. One court has urged the use of such 
protective measures as ordering notice to be directed to 
members of the class, asking them whether they consider 
the representation to be fair and adequate, or requiring 
that the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations 
which include absent persons in the defined class.1Z1 An-
other court has indicated that members of a class not 
parties to the litigation may avoid the binding effect of 
an adverse judgment by attacking the adequacy of the 
representation, or by excluding themselves from mem-
bership in the defined class. III 
The greatest danger from the binding effect of judg-
ments in environmental class actions will result from 
sucli suits as the D.D.T. case, which attempt to represent 
the separate and distinct claims of all Americans.11) In 
such a case, because of the millions of separate and dis-
tinct claims by individual members of the class, it is as 
impossible to obtain fair and adequate representation 
110 See u.s. v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943). 
1%1 Siegel, N. 114 supra; see Green, N. 114 euprm at 298. 
1%2 Eisen, N. 10 Bupra at 563. A member of a class in a Rule 
23 (b) (3) class action must exclude himself from the clasa attion 
"'within a short time of commencement of the Buit, and surely 
never, after a decision on the merits." Minnesota, N. 74 8upra at 676. 
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as it is to obtain a representative with claims typical of 
the class. Leaving members of the public to future col-
• 
• lateral attacks or to seek exclusion in such an action to 
a void the binding effects of a judgment is onerous, par-
ticularly where future scientific knowledge may change 
the scope of the defendant's liability. The courts should 
prevent the binding effects of such presumptuous class 
actions as the D.D.T. case by finding that the claims of 
the representative are not typical of the class or that 
because of the size of the class and the disparity of the 
claims of the members, the representative cannot fairly 
and adequately represent the class, no matter how skilled 
his cOllnsel and how vigorous the prosecution. The mem-
bers of the proposed class should not have the affirmative 
• 
• 
duty to exclude themselves from nor to collaterally attack 
an action which the plaintiff has no right to bring as a 
class action. 
In environmental class actions where the class is 
properly defined and the representation proper, the bind-
ing effects of the judgment in a Rule 23(b) (3) class action 
should be controlled by tbe requirement for notice. U4 This 
requirement becomes more important and thns more 
stringent as the right sued upon becomes more important 
to absent members of the class, A small rebate to com-
muters is far less important to them than health effects 
of various toxic insults to the environment. Rule 23(c) 
(2), which refers to the "best notice practicable under 
the circumstances," has the flexibility to increase the re-
quirements of notice with the seriousness of the rights 
involved, It is desirable that courts thus .correlate the 
notice required to the relief sought. 
Where the rights sought to be vindicated are more 
important collectively than individually, courts have held 
that the notice requirements may be satisfied by publica-
124 See Rule 28 «) (2),28«)(3), 23(d) (2), discussed '"'pro, 
I 
!J4 MINERAL LAW INS'l'ITUTE 
tion'" or even by extensive publicity gh'en to an action in 
the newspapers, .. 6 However, if a large number of individ-
ual members of the class can be identifiNI \\'ith reasonable 
effort, but "financial considerations prp\'ent the plaintiffs 
from furnishing individual notice to these members, there 
may pro\'p to he no alternative other than t1w ,Iismissal 
of th" class snit."'27 
From a plaintiff's view, thc cost of notice is one of the 
major hurdles to overcome in environmental litigation. 
There is not an environmental or conservation organiza. 
tion that is not financially overextended. Despite the ex-
cpssive natnre of some of the claims allll the size of the 
class alleged in some environmental actions, we must re-
member that one of the major values of Rule 23 is to 
allow smaIl stakeholders to make their collective claims 
without prohibitive costs. To require strict notice where 
the class is a broad public interest class suing to vindicate 
public or group rights can unjustly terminate litigation at 
the notice stage. Notice should not be allowed to become a 
defensive weapon but should be, ultimately, a solution 
correlating fairness, practicability, possibility, and the 
type of relief sought. 
In broad litigation purporting to represent public 
rights, some alternative is required which will be less 
expensive and time-consuming than individual notice, but 
more effective than publication. The idea that newspaper 
pUblicity may satisfy the notice requirement would seem 
to run the risk of encouraging outrageous prayers for the 
purpose of advertising the plaintiff's counsel and solving 
notice problems all in one effort. 
I1S Booth, N. 101 supra. at 472. "[S]ome sort 01 ritualistic no-
tice in small print on the back pages of a newspaper would in no 
event suffice." Eisen, N. 10 supra. at 669. 
12' Snyder v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 286 F. 
Supp. 927, 931 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 
ll65 (N.D. III. 1967). 
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An alternative form of notice in environmental class 
actions would be sending individual notice to representa-
tive organizations and individuals eoncerned with the 
protection and quality of the environment. It could be 
assumed thllt they have the experience, funds, and con-
tacts to benefit from the notice. Individual notice would be 
sent to organizations often involved in environmental 
litigation, such as the Sierra Club and the Environmental 
Defense Fund, which might wish to intervene in the action 
to improve the qUlllity of representation or to raise addi-
tional claims or issues. Individual notice would be sent to 
organizlltions involved in educational programs and poli-
tical activities to protect the environment, such as the 
National Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society, 
Friends of the Earth, and Defenders of Wildlife, who 
might be requested to inform their members, many of 
whom might be members of the class, of the action and 
of their rights to intervene or raise objections as to the 
representation. Individual ci tizens who are active in the 
protection of the environment who might wish to appear 
in the action, or might inform memhers of the class of 
their right to appear, would similarly be notified. Notice 
should also be sent to industries and governmental 
agencies with possible interest in the litigation. Afford-
ing notice to organizations and individuals which repre-
sented all possible interests held by the individual mem-
bers of the class would best protect the rights of due 
process of the individual members of the class where in-
dividual notice would be impracticable. Such notice to 
responsible and representative organizations and indi-
viduals eould be expected to mitigate due process ques-
tions, afford the best possible protection of the interests 
of the members of the class, and insure vigorous and re-
sponsible prosecution of the action. 
The notice requirement l S clearly for the benefi t of both 
parties to an action, and for the protection of those ab-
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sent, but who may be bound by litigation. Rule 23 does 
not by its language put the burden of notice on the 
plaintiff."" It may he that the defpnclant has the re-
sources, and access to the class, which would dictate plac-
ing the duty on him.129 In environmental litigation such 
as air pollution litigation against a local public service 
electric utility, where the defendant would regularly bill 
most members of the class each month, the reasoning of 
Dolgow v. Anderson"· would seem to apply and dictate 
that hurden of notice be placed on the defendant. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
In pnvironmental actions, prohlems with the statute 
of limitations will arise where the adverse effl'cts of a 
non-continuing instance of environmental degradation or 
pollution does not become known until a future date, as in 
tbe case of radioactive contamination. The statute of 
limitations may also present a problem in the case of con-
tinuing environmental pollution or degradation, such as 
with air pollution or pesticides with long half-lives 
(whose effects continue for a number of years suhsequent 
to application). In such cases, the limitation period may 
har claims based upon the effects of environmental pollu-
tion prior to the limitation period. In both instances, the 
limitation period may run before the filing of claims by 
members of the class. Another problem that the members 
of the class face is the effect of a determination under 
Rul .. 23(c)(1), made after the limitation period, that an 
action may not he maintained as a class action. 
The Advisory Committee has stated that though an 
action has been determined to be a non-class action under 
Rule 23(c) (1): 
128 "Subdivision (e) (2) does not state that the plaintiffs shall 
provide notice." Dolgow, N. 7 supra at 498. 
129 Compare Dolgow, N. 7 supra, with Minnesota, N. 74 supra, 
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[T]he court may still be receptive to interventions 
before the decision on the merits so that the litigation 
may cover as many interests as can be conveniently 
hamlled; the questions whether the intervenors in the 
non-class action shall be permitted to claim 'ancillary' 
jurisdiction or the benefit of the date of the com-
mencement of the action for purposes of the statute 
of limitations are to be decided by reference to the 
laws governing jurisdiction and limitations as they 
apply in particular contexts.!" 
97 
Where an action has been held to be properly maintained 
as a Rule 23(b) (3) class action, the filing of the class ac-
tion tolls the statute of limitations for absent members 
of the class. Those members of the class who remained 
in the class may date themselves back for the purposes 
of the statute of limitations to the date of the filing of 
the class action.131 These holdings apply to members of 
the class of Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions, 
who may not exclude themselves from the class action. 
By permitting intervention in class actions by members 
of the class for whom the limitations period has run at 
the date of intervention, a court "does not necessarily 
enlarge the period of limitations since the class action 
relates back to the date of the complaint."'" 
However, where the determination under Rule 23(c) (1) 
is that an action may not be maintained as a class action, 
problems of the statute of limitations arise as to the in-
dividual members of the class for whom the limitations 
period has run at the date of this determination. One 
court, though not resolving this problem, has indicated 
III Note, N. 20 ... "'" at 104. 
1>' Minnesota, N. 74 ."p"" at 565; Philadelphia, N. 9 ... pro at (60. 
U) Green, N. 114 I1lpra at 301, footnote 14. However, if the limita-
tion period baa run at the time of the filing of the class action, the 
proposed intervenor would, of course, be barred from intervention, 
or recovery &. a member of the clasl. See, e.g., Slack v. Stiner, 358 
F.2d 65, 70 (5th eire 1966); Escott v. Barchis Canstr. Corp., 340, 
F.2d 731, 732-83 (2d Cir. 1965). 
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that this negative determination should bar individual ac-
tions by members of the class for whom the limitations 
period hilS run. This is done hy having the negative de-
termination relate hack to the filing of the complaint, 
where "the reason for the negative determination is fail-
ure to meet the prerequisites of 23(a) or even if the rea-
son is that the common questions do not predominate over 
individual questions under 23(b)(3) .... "134 However, 
this court indicated that if the negative determination 
was hased upon "a weighing of various considerations of 
judicial housekeeping, it should not relate back to the fil-
ing of the complaint, particularly if the member of the 
class could show reliance upon the pendency of the pur-
ported class action, sufficient to toll the statute of limita-
tions."'" To hold otherwise in this latter situation would 
require every member of the class, out of caution, to file 
a separate, individual action within the limitation period. 
If a class was very large in size, relating back a "house-
keeping" decision would either exclude most of the mem-
hers of the class from recovery or would result in a large 
numbcr of the members of the class filing individual ac-
tions or seeking to intervene, which would be inconsistent 
with thc purposes of Rule 23.130 "Considerations of judi-
cial housekeeping" is a "painfully vague" standard for 
determining which negative determinations under Rule 
23 (c)( 1) should relate back to the filing of the complaint 
for purposes of the statute of limitations. U7 A better 
stant lard would be to have a showing of "reliance" by a 
memher of the class on the filing of the class action, as 
a reason for not filing an individual action within the 
peri 011 of limitations, be grounds for not relating the 
negative determination hack to the filing of the claim. 
114 Philadelphia, N. 9 aupra at 461. 
us Ibid. 
,.6 Tbid. 







A standard that would not relate the negative deter-
mination back to the filing of the claim, where the indi-
vidual could show lack of notice of the class action, would 
he morc inconsistent with Rule 23, since all members of 
the class are not rellllirCfI to have actual notice under 
Rule 23. 
APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 
OF DAMAGES 
Probably the first question in considering apportion-
ment of damages is whether the nature of the claims re-
quires individual restitution. The various transportation 
overcharge cases mentioned previously'" show that in 
many cases individual class members could not care less 
about small refunds; yet, it is important to the deterrent 
theory of law that the wrongdoer not receive a windfall 
merely becanse "e.,act justice" cannot be done. Con-
sequently, in these instances damages should be measured 
by the defendant's unjust gain, rather than by the indi-
vidual damages of the members of the class. A common 
solution to the rate overcharge situation is to reduce fu-
ture fares on the assumption that those overcharged will 
continue to use the defendant's transportation. It would 
be hoped that these logical approaches would be carried 
over to the environmental field. Where individual appro-
tionment of damages would be difficult in environmental 
class actions, a court might require the defendant to in-
stall pollution control equipment in air and water pollu-
tion cases, or to rehabilitate the environment in pesticide 
and radiation cases, rather than to award individual 
damages. 
If individual restitution is needed, there are several 
ways that damages may be apportioned ami distributed 
US See Ns. 32-33, supra. 
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to members of a class. One method would be to have the 
representative party estahliah the defendant's liahility 
for damages to each memhpr of the class, and then havl' 
the individual memhers of the class come forward, after 
receiving notice, to ohtain their share of damages. Th£' 
court might distrilmt .. til(> damages to tim individual 
members of the class, or might require that the plaintiff 
or .Iefendant supervise the distrihution, as a truswe, to 
t he indivi.lual mpmhers of ti,e class ... • 
Another method of distributing damages in pnviron-
mental class actions would be to have the individual 
members of the class establish. their individual claims, 
either before the court or an appointed master14' after 
th" representative party has established the general 
liahility of the defendant. 
However, it may often be necessary for individual 
members of the class to establish both the defendant's 
liability to them and their claim for damages, where the 
defendant's general liability to the class cannot be 
established. This latter situation is the more likely in 
environmental class actions seeking damages, since the 
claims of individual members of the class for injury 
will usually be separate and distinct, requiring indi-
vidual proof of liability and injury. In such cases, the 
court sbould, by notice, direct the individual members 
of the class to file claims for damages and provide 
methods for them to prove their claims. 
The court may provide that these individual claims 
may be handled through a master.'" However, class 
actions that require such procedures because separate 
and distinct claims or the individual members of the 
class raise individual issues of liability and injury may, 
139 See Kalven & Rosenfield, "The Contemporary Function of a 
Class Suit," 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 694 (1941). 
".Id. at 693-695. 
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on closer examination, be found not to be properly 
maintained class actions. 
One solution to the problem would be, through notice, 
to rcquire members of the class to file within a reason-
able period of time "a brief statement of their intent 
to prove damages; if they failed to do so, their claims 
would be barred."'" This solution "would revcal the true 
scope of the litigation, and would greatly reduce the 
trouble and expense of any subsequent notices which 
might be required, or provide a basis for informed re-
appraisal of the class action question under Rule 
23(c) (1)."'" Thus, rather than barring the claims of 
those memhers of the class who do not present claims 
for individual damages, the court might reconsider 
whether the class had been properly defined, since lack 
of affirmative response might indicate that those indi-
viduals had not suffered damages and were not members 
of the class. 
However, if a court chooses to place snch an affirma-
tive requirement on the members of the class, it should 
make sure that those members of the class who are 
barred for failure to file claims have probably received 
notice of this requirement. The notice in this situation, 
which occurs before the trial on the merits, should be 
more likely to achieve actual notice than notice that 
would be required subsequent to judgment of general 
Iiahility, since the penalty for failure to file a proof of 
claim at this time precludes a member of the class from 
participating in the trial on its merits. This requirement 
of an affirmative response by members of the class in 
order to share in the judgment might not he required, 
142 Philadelphia, N. 9 SUpTa. at 469. State of Iowa v. Union Asphalt 
& Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403--404 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Harris 
v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966). 
I •• Philadelphia, N. 142 supra. 
, 
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however, where it would he tedious and would not "expe-
dite or clarify the action."I •• 
ATTORNEY FEES 
In actions seeking damages for injury to health or 
welfare or for environmental degradation or pollution, 
many individual claims could not be litigated in separate 
actions because the claims would be so small that no 
attorney would prosecute the claim.I' s Because of this 
fact, attorneys may attempt to join these small claims 
in class actions. Substantial recovery by the class would 
then provide a source of fees for the attorney. 
Attorneys might thus bring suit on behalf of clients 
with small individual claims as class actions, hoping to 
prosecute the claims of all members of the class and 
to receive fees on a contingent basis from all members 
for whom recovery is made. 
Problems of unethical solicitation may thus be pre-
sented. However, solicitation is a problem only until a 
Rule 23 (e)( 1) hearing determines that an action may 
or may not be maintained as a class action, since sub-
sequent to that determination the court can control 
solicitation by regulating the use of notice. I .. 
Rule 23 recoguizes that notice may be used for solici-
tation, rather than to protect the members of the class 
or to insure the fair conduct of the action.I' 7 Courts 
can control such solicitation by requiring the fonn of 
notice to he approved by the court before it can be 
144 See Berman v. Narraganset Racing Ass'n. 48 F.R.D. 333, 338 
(D.R.I. 1969). 
145 Eisen, N. 10 supra. at 666-667, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 
370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), DoJgow, N. 7 .up .... at 494-495. 
146 Starr, uThe Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerationa 
of Procedure," 49 B.U.L. Rev. 407, 409 (1969). 
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directed to the members of the c1ass.'o, It is proper to 
inform members of the class in individual notices that 
their interests in the class action will be represented 
by the plaintiff's counsel unless they enter an appear-
ance through counsel of their own choosing.lo, However, 
courts have not allowed the names or addresses of 
plaintiff's counsel to appear in published or individual 
notice, using the office of the clerk of the court as a 
return address.'s. Such a procedure, thongh adding some 
administrative burdens to the courts, does control the 
problem of solicitation. 
The amount of attorncy's fees to be paid by non-party 
members of the class for whom plaintiff's counsel has 
collected damages may be determined and the payment 
ordered by the court.15I This would be the preferable 
method of determination and payment of attorney's fees 
in class actions, since it would avoid the solicitation 
problems where the plaintiff's counsel personally 
arranges attorney's fees on a contingent basis with each 
member of the class, and would insure, through judicial 
supervision, that the plaintiff's counsel was not the only 
person to benefit from the class action.1Sl The court 
could insure that the attorney's fees were fair, taking 
into account the diminished paper work and increased 
efficiency in handling individual claims in a class action, 
while insuring that the non-party members of the class 
did pay attorney's fees to plaintiff's counsel. The fees 
in environmental class actions should be determined on 
a quantum meruit basis by the court, not by individual 
fee contracts. IS. 
141 See Berman, N. 144 supra. at 339. 
IO'ibid-
,so Ibid-
151 See N. 146 supra. 
152 See, e.g., Eisen, N. 10 supra. at 567. 
lSJ Kalven &. Rosenfield, N. 140 8upra at 717. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is an obvious, real, and immediate need to pull 
back even further from our laissez-faire approach to 
resource management. To an increasing number of us 
it is more than esthetics, more than amenities, more 
than a question 6f our standard of living. It is a question 
of survival. The fact of a need however, does not suggest 
that we should grasp every remedy no matter how 
unappropriate. 
Rule 23 offers a procedural device for certain group 
relief and a deterrent against the commission of certain 
group injuries. It can be useful in manageable situations, 
i.e., to the stockholder, the employee, the taxpayer, the 
ratepayer or the minority member suing for specific equi-
table relief against a certain defendant. Class actions 
allow a plaintiff to lay on the scales not only his interests, 
but also the interests of other dispersed, isolated, and 
anonymous members of the same class. Use of the class 
action is being threatened from a number of sources. 
Plaintiffs' lawyers lise the class action as a public rela-
tions device to warn of apocalyptic disaster or as a self-
promotional gimmick. It is threatened by defendants' law-
yers who use the "notice" requirement as a defensiye 
weapon to force unnecessary and el>."pensive notice. In-
trinsically, it is threatened by the very requirements of 
amended Rule 23. Rule 23, in attempting to allocate the 
burdens of litigation, has seriously restricted the use of 
class actions by requiring the judgment to apply to all 
absent members of the class. Serious restrictions on the 
lise of environmental class actions for damages are im-
posed by the inability to aggregate the claims of the class 
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. 
Our legal system is undergoing a rethinking of many 
of its basic concepts. "Fault" is being questioned in our 
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llndprgoing the same re·examination. We are getting 
away from the concept of mutuality in collateral 
estopp<,1 and we should remove it from class actions. 
Mutuality puts symmetry into the law of class actions, 
and allows llS to say that if the plaintiff can take ad-
vantage of the judgment, so should he be bound by an 
adverB" judgm<'nt. However, we pay a price in logic for 
this symmetry. The equities are not balanced between 
the parties. The defendant has been afforded his day 
in court amI if he loses he at least had the opportunity 
to fully present his case in his own behalf by his own 
attorney. The absentee plaintiff, however has not had 
his rlay in court. He has been "represented," often with-
out his knowledge, by a stranger and a lawyer not of his 
choosing. 
The present amended Rule 23 substantially restricts 
the use of class actions, for res judicata hanging over the 
proceedings like the sword of Damocles and the economic 
realities of notice require unnecessarily restricted classes. 
Rule 23 often impairs the ability of absent members 
of the class to assert their rights, and yet superficially 
tempts the champertous lawyer and the strike sniter 
to obtain a large fee through use of the class action. 
The old class action rule had adequate protection 
against litigation such as the D.D.T. and El Paso cases, 
and also implemented the policy considerations which 
originated class action litigation. The environmental 
litigator would be served better by the "spurious" class 
action of old Rule 23 than by amended Rule 23. 
